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Abstract
Gas prices around the world vary widely despite being connected by inter-
national trade of LNG. Some industry observers argue that major exporters
(e.g., Qatar) have acted irrationally by failing to engage in price arbitrage.
This is also di¢ cult to reconcile with a perfectly competitive model in which
price di¤erences exist solely because of transport costs. We show that a model
with market power can rationalize observed price di¤erentials and trade ows.
We highlight how di¤erent features of the LNG market limit the ability and/or
incentive of other players to arbitrage, and discuss the potential impact of US
LNG exports.
Keywords: International trade, limits to arbitrage, LNG pricing, market
power, natural gas, price discrimination
JEL classications: D40 (Market Structure and Pricing), F12 (Trade with
Imperfect Competition), L95 (Gas Transportation)
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1 Introduction
Not so long ago, there was a widespread conjecture that gas prices around the
world would converge. The idea was that international trade in liqueed natural
gas (LNG) would connect previously separate geographies notably the regional
markets of Asia, Europe and the US and thereby link their pricing.
The volume of LNG trade has indeed grown signicantly since the early 2000s,
against the backdrop of liberalization of electricity and gas industries, and a general
increase in demand for natural gas. Global investment in LNG infrastructure
liquefaction and regasication capacity has increased, and such facilities are now
spread across more countries. The global LNG tanker eet has expanded signi-
cantly, and transport costs have fallen.1
Importantly, too, contracting arrangements between buyers and sellers have be-
come more exible. Traditionally, an LNG project involves a bilateral long-term
contract, say of a 20-year duration, between a buyer and seller, to back up the
initial investment. However, there is an ongoing shift towards trade in spot and
short-term markets; these have increased ten-fold since 2000, and now make up 25%
of total LNG sales (GIIGNL, 2012).2 This development has been aided, amongst
other things, by the adoption of Master Sales Agreements for LNG, which create
standardization and reduce transaction costs.
Yet gas prices around the world today vary widely, and these di¤erences have
become more pronounced in the aftermath of the Fukushima accident of March
2011. The average price of natural gas in 2012 was roughly US$16/MMBtu in
Japan, around $9 in European markets like the UK, but only $3 in the US. Some
expect large regional price disparities to persist, including the International Energy
Agency in its modelling scenarios for both 2020 and 2035. In short, the gas market
today appears far from global.
For the case of the US, the reasons for price divergence are quite clear. First, the
large-scale emergence of shale gas over the last few years has put strong downward
pressure on US natural gas prices. Second, the US at present only has very limited
LNG export capability; its infrastructure still reects the assumption of the 2000s
that the US would become a major LNG importer. As a result, the US market has
been largely isolated from the rest of the world.3
1Useful overviews of the LNG industry as of the mid 2000s are provided by Jensen (2003) and
Yergin and Stoppard (2003), with a focus, respectively, on economics and geopolitics.
2Brito and Hartley (2007) argue that the expectation of a shift towards short-term multilateral
trading can have self-fullling properties.
3Several applications to create LNG liquefaction facilities are currently pending US regula-
tory/political approval.
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The other price gaps require a di¤erent explanation, and some industry observers
have argued they imply that LNG exporters have been behaving irrationally.
Several major LNG exporters make short-term sales to Asia but simultaneously
supply Northwest Europe at far lower prices. This behaviour may appear irrational
in that it entails a forgone prot = jprice di¤erentialj  quantity sold to the lower-
priced market. For Qatari short-term sales to the UK, rather than to Japan, some
estimates suggest a forgone prot of up to $100 million per day (in late 2011), and
a cumulative gure in the billions over the period from April 2011 to April 2012.4
LNG producers are, apparently, failing to engage in price arbitrage by not exiting
the European market (at least for short-term sales).
The most immediate explanation for price divergence lies in transport costs. In
particular, a simple perfectly competitive model predicts that the price di¤erence
across two regions served by an exporter equals the di¤erence in the associated
transport costs. Put di¤erently, the netback that is, price minus transport cost
for the exporter should be the same for each region.
The problem with this theory is that it cannot explain the kinds of price di¤er-
ences recently observed in LNG markets. Consider again the case of Qatar, which
is the largest LNG producer (with a global market share of around 30%). Figure
1 shows the di¤erential between the Platts JKM (Japan Korea Marker) price for
Asian LNG and the UK NBP (National Balancing Point) price, plotted against the
di¤erence in transport costs between shipping from Qatar to Japan and Qatar to
the UK, respectively.5 ;6 Prices are up to $10/MMBtu higher in Asia than in the
UK, while the corresponding transport costs are approximately identical. Perfect
competition, by contrast, predicts that these two di¤erentials should coincide.7
The simple theory also fails to explain the data on two broader counts. First,
over large parts of the sample period (early 2010 until early 2013) it even predicts the
wrong sign: transport costs to the UK are typically slightly higher than to Japan,
while prices are much lower. Second, there is excess volatility: transport costs are
far too stable to be able to explain the observed volatility of (relative) gas prices.
The perfectly competitive model cannot account for other producersbehaviour.
For example, Peru is in a similar position to Qatar in that its transport-cost di¤er-
ential to European and Asian markets is usually very small (Platts, 2012), and yet
4These deliveries are estimated as 75% higher than contractual obligations.
5Qatari sales to Japan and UK are the two largest routes of short-term LNG, with global shares
of 10% and 6% respectively (GIIGNL, 2012).
6Source: Calculations based on data from Platts, Poten & Partners, and ICAP (via Bloomberg).
7This theoretical prediction should, of course, not be taken too literally. Temporary deviations
are to be expected in the face of short-term demand and supply shocks. However, large price
divergences persisting for several years are di¢ cult to reconcile with this theory.
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Figure 1: Qatar LNG sales to Japan vs UK Di¤erences in gas prices compared to
di¤erences in transport costs
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it still makes short-term sales to both (GIIGNL, 2012). For other major producers,
such as Nigeria and Trinidad & Tobago, transport costs to Asia are indeed higher
(by around $23.50/MMBtu) but still often not su¢ cient to explain observed sales
and prices.
In this paper, we instead suggest that regional price di¤erentials can arise be-
cause of LNG exportersmarket power. Consider a producer who can sell uncom-
mitted LNG into two export markets. In general, prot-maximization implies that
the producer equalizes marginal revenue, net of the marginal cost of production
and transport costs, across the two markets. If transport costs are identical as is
roughly the case for Qatars sales to the UK and Japan then export quantities are
such that marginal revenues for each region are equal.
Our key point is simply that equalizing marginal revenue is not necessarily the
same thing as equalizing price. Put di¤erently, for an exporter with market power,
the arbitrageprocess stops when its marginal revenues are equalized; it is entirely
possible that this optimally leaves prices across markets far apart. This basic ar-
gument extends straightforwardly to a producer selling into more than two export
markets, and to situations with a capacity constraint on production. Moreover, the
argument does not depend on any particular assumption on the mode of (strategic)
competition in LNG; it applies for a monopolist, a Cournot-Nash player, a dominant
rm facing a competitive fringe, and so on.8
8We do not suggest that LNG producers are colluding, but rather that at least some of them
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We provide a new general formula for relative prices between any two export
markets, in terms of a sellers transport costs and price elasticities of demand.9
Incorporating market power can rationalize recent gas prices and trade ows by
tracing them to relative demand conditions. The Fukushima accident, for instance,
e¤ectively switched o¤ large parts of Japanese nuclear power, leading to an increase
in demand for imported LNG to ll the gap. From the viewpoint of an individual
LNG seller (with a degree of market power), under fairly general conditions, an
upward shift in market demand translates into a lower demand elasticity and thus
a higher price. Importantly, note that local demand conditions play no role in the
competitive model, in which price di¤erences are solely driven by transport costs.
We can also o¤er a perspective on the possibility that the US will become a
large LNG exporter over the coming years. What is the likely impact on gas prices?
Our analysis makes clear that US and non-US prices will not necessarily converge
as a result, even allowing for transport costs. It also suggests that any model of the
e¤ect of US LNG exports is likely to be incomplete if it does not take market power
into account. For example, a recent model-based simulation for the US Department
of Energy incorporates general-equilibrium e¤ects but assumes that LNG producers
do not respond strategically to US market entry.10
Our model of price discrimination with imperfect competition is static and thus
does not capture intertemporal features of the LNG market (such as storage).11 In
practice, there may be a dynamic interaction between short-term LNG prices and
long-term contracts. (Our model examines pricing incentives in short-term markets,
taking long-term commitments as given.) In particular, a large proportion of LNG
imports is still governed by long-term contracts whose terms may be renegotiated
from time to time. Some LNG producers may have been reluctant to push down
short-term prices in Asia insofar as this would make it more di¢ cult to sustain
highprices on long-term contracts in the future. At its core, this argument has
a similar avour to ours; while our model is based on exportersmarket power in
short-term markets, this argument is essentially about exportersbargaining power
in negotiations of long-term contracts.
Related literature. A number of empirical papers have examined price conver-
have a degree of market power (i.e., are not textbook price-takers) in some of their export markets.
See Egging, Holz, von Hirschhausen and Gabriel (2009) for a recent analysis of Gas OPEC.
9Our approach does not rely on production cost data.
10NERA (2012) assumes Qatar is largebut does not alter its production strategy in response to
US exports, while other producers are represented as a competitive fringe; the model is augmented
with (exogenous) mark-up adjustments in order to be able to replicate observed regional gas prices.
11Chaton and Durant-Viel (2013) analyze the value of gas storage when rms have market power.
5
EPRG 1317
gence in natural gas markets.12 Siliverstovsa et al. (2005) obtain mixed results
from a cointegration analysis using data from the early 1990s until 2004; they nd
evidence for market integration between European and Japanese markets, but no
integration between North America and Japan. Over the period 1999 to 2008, Neu-
mann (2009) nds increased convergence of gas spot prices between North America
and Asia. However, there does not appear to be any econometric analysis of gas-price
convergence post-2011.13 Others have focused on price convergence within regional
markets; for example, Doane and Spulber (1994) employ similar techniques to an
integrated, national market for natural gas in the US.14 By contrast, we here o¤er
an economic-theory perspective on price non-convergence, with a view to explaining
observed prices since March 2011. We use the standard non-cooperative approach
to pricing strategies; see Hubert and Ikkonikova (2011) for a recent application of
cooperative game theory to bargaining and investment in natural gas markets.
Also related is the literature on market power in crude oil, which estimates the
level of market competitiveness with a particular emphasis on the role of OPEC,
see, e.g., Salant (1976), Almoguera, Douglas and Herrera (2011), and Nakov and
Nuño (2013). Much of this literature concludes that the world crude oil market can
be modelled either as a set of dominant producers facing a competitive fringe, or
as something close to Cournot-Nash competition. Thereby, most oil models simply
assume a single global oil price; indeed, international price di¤erentials in crude
oil are typically small and mainly reect quality di¤erences between oil varieties
from di¤erent regions. In contrast, this paper focuses on natural gas, for which the
existing literature and the market is much less well-developed; it obtains results
that apply for a wide range of competitive conditions, and focuses explicitly on the
limits to international price arbitrage in LNG.15
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a model of
LNG pricing across di¤erent export markets to formalize the market-power argument
we have outlined above. Section 3 provides a discussion of how di¤erent features of
the LNG market limit the ability and/or incentive of other players (such as LNG
buyers and third-party traders) to engage in price arbitrage, including constraints
in LNG shipping. Section 4 o¤ers concluding remarks, including a discussion of the
12The chapters in Stern (2012) provide a detailed overview of how gas-pricing mechanisms vary
across di¤erent regions.
13We conjecture that international price correlations have declined signicantly (compared to
the mid/late 2000s), and that the Fukushima accident represents a structural break.
14There are also several recent simulation-based models of gas-market integration in the EU, see,
e.g., Holz, von Hirschhausen and Kemfert (2008) and Lise and Hobbs (2009).
15There may be an interesting analogy between the globalization of oil markets during the
1970s/1980s and ongoing developments in natural gas, but this is beyond our current scope.
6
EPRG 1317
potential e¤ects of greater price arbitrage, in the future, on LNG prices, industry
prots, and social welfare.
2 A prot-maximizing LNG exporter
Consider an LNG producer selling output into N  2 export markets.
Let pki (x
k
i ; y
k
i ; X
 k
i ; Y
 k
i ; i) denote the inverse demand function producer k faces
in market i (i = 1; 2; :::; N), where pki is the spotprice of LNG,
16 xki is the quantity
sold by the producer in the short-term market, while yki is the quantity the producer
has pre-committed to sell in market i by way of long-term contracts (which we here
take as given). Analogously, X ki is the vector of outputs sold by other producers in
the spot market while Y  ki captures their long-term commitments.
17 Other factors
that a¤ect demand in market i are summarized by the vector i. For example,
this might include the prices of coal, oil and other substitute products, the state of
business cycle, other demand shocks, the weather, and so on.18
The producers cost function Ck(
PN
i=1(x
k
i + y
k
i )) depends on the sum of total
quantities sold in all N export markets, including spot market sales as well as long-
term commitments. Production may be subject to a capacity constraint such thatPN
i=1(x
k
i + y
k
i )  Q
k
.19 In addition to this, the producer incurs a transport cost tki
per unit of output sold to market i. This mainly reects the cost of shipping and
may vary across export markets depending on distance and other factors (and also
vary across di¤erent producers).
Producer ks prot-maximization problem is to choose the amount of LNG to
export to each market, given any long-term commitments already entered into:
max
fxki gNi=1
k =
PN
i=1 p
k
i x
k
i   Ck(
PN
i=1(x
k
i + y
k
i )) 
PN
i=1 t
k
i x
k
i
subject to
PN
i=1(x
k
i + y
k
i )  Q
k
.
We assume, without much loss of additional economic insight, that this problem
is well-behaved with an interior solution for each of the N export markets. The
Langrangean for constrained optimization can be written as Lk = k + k(Q  
16We allow prices to be producer-specic, e.g., to be able to reect (small) quality di¤erentials.
17From a buyers point of view, LNG from short-term markets and long-term contracts may be
imperfect substitutes.
18Some of these factors may a¤ect individual producers in di¤erent ways, and some may inuence
demand conditions in several export markets.
19Adding a production constraint in terms of minimum throughput to ensure smooth operation,PN
i=1
 
xki + y
k
i
  Qk, would not a¤ect the following results.
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PN
i=1(x
k
i + y
k
i )), where 
k  0 is the shadow value of the capacity constraint (i.e.,
the value of an incremental relaxation of the capacity constraint), which is non-zero
if the producer is capacity-constrained and zero if it is not).
The optimal output choice bxki by producer k in market i satises the rst-order
conditionMRki MCk tki k = 0, whereMRki is marginal revenue from short-term
sales, and MCk is the marginal cost of production. Using the rst-order conditions
for any two export markets, say i and j, shows that these are related by
MRki   tki = MRkj   tkj .
This is the fundamental condition for prot-maximization. The cost of an additional
unit of output is the same regardless where it ends up being sold in, both in terms
of the marginal cost of production and the shadow value of using the capacity
elsewhere. (This holds regardless of whether or not the producer is, in fact, capacity-
constrained.) To maximize prots, therefore, the producer balances at the margin
the contribution of each export market in terms of sales revenue and transport costs.
So marginal revenue net of transport costs is equalized across export markets.
Marginal revenue in market i can be written as MRki = p
k
i
 
1  1=ki

, where
ki is the own-price elasticity of producer ks demand. From here on, this elasticity
is understood to be evaluated at producer ks optimally chosen output bxki , as well
as at the actual levels of short-term output of other producers and corresponding
actual long-term commitments, that is, ki = 
k
i (bxki ; yki ; X ki ; Y  ki ; i).20 Combining
this expression with the fundamental condition for prot-maximization leads to:
Proposition 1 A prot-maximizing producer k sells into N  2 export markets
with a common marginal cost (and possibly subject to a capacity constraint, Q
k
).
(A) In any two markets i and j, prot-maximizing prices (pki ; p
k
j ) satisfy
(pki   pkj )
pki
=
ki 
ki   1
 " 1
ki
  1
kj
!
+
 
tki   tkj

pki
#
,
where (tki ; t
k
j ) are transport costs and (
k
i ; 
k
j ) are own-price elasticities of demand;
(B) Any observed prices (pki ; p
k
j ) and transport costs (t
k
i ; t
k
j ) in markets i and j can
be rationalized by some values for the price elasticities of demand (ki ; 
k
j ).
Understanding prot-maximizing prices. The formula for relative prices from
(A) is rather general: it does not rely on any specic functional-form assumptions
20A necessary condition for prot-maximization is that producer demand remains price-elastic
in each market, ki > 1. (Otherwise the producer could protably reduce output.) Market-level
demand elasticities can be signicantly lower.
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on demand and cost functions (e.g., linear, constant-elasticity, etc.), or on a partic-
ular form of competitive conduct in each export markets. Commonly-used models,
e.g., perfect competition, monopoly, Cournot-Nash oligopoly, dominant rm with a
competitive fringe, etc., are nested as special cases; the mode of competition may
also di¤er across export markets. An informational advantage is that it does not
feature production costs. (The result does also not assume that either consumers
or other producers are payo¤-maximizers; their behaviour, rational or otherwise,
is fully captured by the producers own-price elasticities of demand across export
markets.)
To understand the properties of the model, consider a few special cases:
First, the simple perfectly competitive model is nested where the producers
demand elasticity ki ! 1 in each export market i = 1; 2; :::; N . This corresponds
to a situation in which the producer is a price taker without any market power (so
its marginal revenue is equal to the market price in each market). Prices in any two
markets satisfy
 
pki   pkj

=
 
tki   tkj

, and netbacks are equalized.
Second, suppose that the equilibrium values of the price elasticities of demand
in two exports market are identical, ki = 
k
j = b < 1. Then the expression for
the price di¤erential becomes
 
pki   pkj

=
 
tki   tkj
b= (b   1). Relative to perfect
competition, (symmetric) market power thus exacerbates any price di¤erential across
export markets that is due to transport costs.
Third, assume that transport costs to two markets are identical, tki = t
k
j . Relative
price then satises
 
pki   pkj

=pki =
 
kj   ki

=
 
ki   1

kj so p
k
i > p
k
j if and only if
ki < 
k
j . This shows that (i) prices can diverge across markets for reasons of market
power, not transport costs, and that (ii) strongermarkets, in which a producer
faces a lower price elasticity of demand, have higher prices.
Fourth, if price elasticities and transport costs across two markets satisfy ki  kj
and tki  tkj , then prices must satisfy pki  pkj . Intuitively, market i is far-and-
strong, with greater market power as well as higher costs, while market j is near-
and-weak. If either of these relationships is strict, then pki > p
k
j .
A model with market power can thus explain a far greater range of observed
prices than the simple competitive model. Most importantly, transport costs are
no longer the sole driver of price di¤erentials; relative demand conditions across
export markets now also play a key role. It relaxes the strong restriction that
sign
 
pki   pkj

= sign
 
tki   tkj

, and also features excess volatilityin prices, by going
beyond the implication from the competitive model that var
 
pki   pkj

= var
 
tki   tkj

.
Rationalizing observed prices. Part (B) of the result is that the model with
market power can rationalize any observed price di¤erences between export markets.
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The reason is as follows. Appropriate choice of the price elasticity for market i can
generate any non-negative price-cost margin, ranging from zero (when ki !1) to
arbitrarily large (when ki ! 1), regardless of the underlying details of the producers
costs.21 So it is always possible to nd an elasticity to rationalize the observed price
in any market, and thus also to generate correct relative prices across markets.
Consider a numerical example based on Qatari LNG sales to Japan and North-
west Europe (i = Japan, j = UK, k = Qatar). Let prices pki = 16 and p
k
j = 9, and
assume, for simplicity, that transport costs are identical, tki = t
k
j . It is not di¢ cult
to check that these relative prices can be rationalized by a pair of elasticities ki = 2
and kj = 9. Such prices can thus be explained by producers having relatively greater
market power in Japan.
So recent claims that LNG producers are acting irrationally by simultaneously
selling short-term cargoes to both Northwest Europe and Asian markets are not
necessarily correct. It can be entirely rational for a prot-maximizing seller to
pursue a strategy that leaves prices in Japan far higher, in response to stronger
demand. In e¤ect, it uses sales to the UK to keep prices in Japan high.22
Why might producers have greater market power in Japan? The Fukushima
accident e¤ectively switched o¤ large parts of Japanese nuclear power, leading to an
increase in demand for imported LNG so as to ll the gap. From the viewpoint
of an individual LNG seller (with a degree of market power), under fairly general
conditions, an upward shift in market demand (captured formally by a change in
i) translates into a lower price elasticity of demand. This, in turn, typically leads
to an increase in quantity of LNG supplied but also to an increase in its price, as is
consistent with market experience since Fukuskima.
More generally, it is frequently suggested that Asian buyers are more concerned
about security of supply than European buyers. This translates into a higher
willingness-to-pay for a unit of LNG and, all else equal, a lower elasticity. Further-
more, Asian buyers have fewer possibilities to substitute for LNG, notably because
of more limited access to Russian pipeline gas.
Estimating producer-specic elasticities of demand. A feature of the model
is that the pair of elasticities to rationalize the data is, in general, not unique. In the
numerical example for Qatar, the data pki = 16, p
k
j = 9, and t
k
i = t
k
j are rationalized
for any pair of elasticities (ki ,
k
j ) that satises (1   ki =kj )=(ki   1) = 79 . Setting
(ki ,
k
j ) = (2; 9) is but one solution. Loosely put, getting the relative elasticities
21A negative price-cost margin cannot be prot-maximizing in the present model.
22It is also economically ine¢ cient in that di¤erent consumers are paying di¤erent prices for
essentially the same good (so their marginal utilities are unequal).
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across markets correct matters more than their absolute values.
Pinning down unique values for the elasticities requires more information and/or
additional modelling assumptions. We here suggest three possible approaches:
First, recall that the above results did not rely on production cost informa-
tion, or on any knowledge of whether the producer is, in fact, capacity-constrained.
However, if such information is available, this immediately identies the producer-
specic demand elasticity. To see this, rewrite the rst-order condition for prot-
maximization in market i, using the relationship MRki = p
k
i
 
1  1=ki

, to obtain
ki = p
k
i =

(pki   tki )  (MCk + k)

. In the numerical example for Qatar, knowledge
that (MCk + k) = 6 would select the values (ki ,
k
j ) = (2; 9) as the unique way of
rationalizing the data. Perhaps most realistically, an assessment that the producer is
not capacity-constrained, i.e., k = 0, together with data on (pki ,t
k
i ,MC
k) identies
ki for each individual market.
23
Second, it is possible, in principle, to estimate the elasticity for an individual mar-
kets, ki , or the entire vector of elasticities

ki
	N
i=1
, using econometric techniques.
This would require time-series data on prices and quantities in each market of in-
terest, as well as relevant control variables (probably including data on producers
long-term contractual commitments).
Third, it may be possible to justify more specic assumptions on competitive
conduct. For instance, it is quite common in the analysis of natural gas markets to
assume Cournot-Nash competition between sellers. Then an individual producer ks
demand elasticity ki = i=s
k
i , where i is the price elasticity of market demand, and
ski 2 (0; 1) is the producers market share (in the appropriately dened market i).
Market share data are generally easier to obtain, and it is usually easier to estimate
a market-level elasticity than a producer-specic elasticity.
To continue our numerical example from above, suppose it is estimated that
two markets have identical price elasticities i = j =
1
2
(say for natural gas); the
producer-specic elasticities (ki ,
k
j ) = (2; 9) would then be generated by producer
k having market shares (ski ,s
k
j ) = (25%; 5
5
9
%) respectively in the two markets. Al-
ternatively, if the producer had identical market shares ski = s
k
j = 10%, then the
corresponding market-level elasticities would be (i,j) = (
1
5
; 9
10
).
Unfortunately, we currently do not have su¢ ciently rich data on costs, prices,
and quantities to be able to pursue either of the rst two of these approaches; we
return to the impact of price discrimination under di¤erent competitive conditions
in our concluding remarks below.
23Put di¤erently, for each seller, there are N rst-order conditions but N +2 unknowns, namely,
ki
	N
i=1
, MCk, and k, but since MCk+k is a su¢ cient statistic for (MCk; k) the system boils
down to N + 1 unknowns.
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3 Limits to price arbitrage in LNG markets
Our model o¤ers an explanation for why it may be optimal for prices across regions
to be di¤erent from the viewpoint of an LNG producer. Implicit in the model, as in
virtually all literature on price discrimination, is that other players do not undermine
this sales strategy. We here discuss a number of reasons, many particular to LNG
markets, that either limit the ability of other players to engage in arbitrage or create
incentives that work against pursuing arbitrage in the rst place.
The textbook assumption that sustains price discrimination by a seller is that
buyers cannot engage in resale. Although there is a trend towards more exible
LNG contracting arrangements, some destination restrictionsappear to persist.
For example, it is said that state-controlled LNG exporters still normally restrict the
resale of their exports in a way that prevents them from being traded on commodity
exchanges. This means that some price arbitrage opportunities, if they exist, cannot
be exploited for contractual reasons.
LNG arbitrage may also be di¢ cult because of limited shipping capacity.24 Al-
though there now are on the order of 400 vessels for transporting LNG, only a small
proportion of the eet is uncommitted, in the sense of not being tied to a long-term
sales contract. Thus only few companies appear to have direct access to both un-
committed gas supplies and uncommitted LNG tankers. So an LNG buyer wishing
to engage in price arbitrage may nd that the shipping market is either unable or
unwilling to provide transport at the required price.25 Note that this latter argu-
ment has some similarity to our model from above; it involves market power in the
shipping market rather than (or in addition to) the LNG market itself.26
In addition to this, there are at least two reasons to do with vertical structure
for why arbitrage, even if possible, may not be in the interest of an LNG buyer.
First, while redirecting cargo, say, from northwest Europe to Japan may promise a
higher price, it also means that the LNG buyer can no longer sell or use the gas
further downstream in the European market. So redirecting cargo may also forgo
downstream surplus, which works against the incentive to arbitrage. Second, owner-
ship arrangements along the LNG supply chain are much more complex than in any
24Our model assumes that an LNG producer takes transport costs as given when choosing its sales
strategy, and that transport is available for any desired export volume to any market. Moreover,
our numerical illustrations use publicly available shipping rates as being representative.
25In some cases, there may also be compability issues; not all import terminals are able to receive
deliveries from all types of LNG tankers.
26There is also a potential feedback e¤ect: Since short-term LNG typically involves longer dis-
tances than trade from long-term contracts, more price arbitrage tends to further tighten the
shipping market, and may thus to some extent undermine itself. Thanks to Philipp Koenig for
this point.
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simple model. Several LNG players hold partial (<100%) ownership stakes at var-
ious points along the supply chain including in LNG production and liquefaction,
shipping, regasication, and downstream gas as well as across di¤erent countries.
Put simply, a company may be an LNG seller in country A, an LNG buyer in coun-
try B, and have an infrastructure stake in country C. Such a players overall prot
function and hence incentive structure is more di¢ cult to work out. However, it
seems plausible that the overall incentive sometimes works against arbitrage. In any
case, vertical issues mean that a simple comparison of netbacks may not be enough.
If neither LNG sellers nor LNG buyers have a strong incentive to engage in price
arbitrage, what about third parties such as traders? A recent industry report o¤ers
an interesting perspective on this question: The entry barriers to LNG trading
are surprisingly high new entrants require more than just experienced traders and
trading systems. They must have access to cargoes, but the markets liquidity is
typically held captive by the LNG liquefaction owners/upstream suppliers who are
understandably very reluctant to release volumes for traders to trade with. Traders
must also have access to shipping, either via owned vessels or the charter market.
Furthermore, certain ships can unload at certain terminals (e.g., many import ter-
minals cannot accommodate Q-Max vessels). This can make it even more di¢ cult
to e¢ ciently connect volumes to buyers. (JP Morgan Cazenove, 2012). That is,
physical arbitrage requires su¢ cient capacities along the entire supply chain; almost
by denition, this is more di¢ cult for third parties to secure.
It is worth highlighting a few other considerations which, in practice, make LNG
arbitrage di¢ cult and nancially risky and are typically neglected in models of
price discrimination. The rst is units. While the ow of gas is, in some sense,
continuous, the economics of LNG transport involves an indivisibility: the unit of
account is, in e¤ect, a tanker. As a result, only players with su¢ ciently deep
pockets can enter the market. The second is time. It can take two weeks, for
example, to ship LNG from Qatar to Japan. Given the volatility of gas prices, it
is possible for there to be a signicant shift in relative prices over such a period of
time. So risk management becomes an important factor, both for LNG sales and
potential arbitrage activity. Although nancial instruments for natural gas exist,
the derivatives market specically for LNG is relatively underdeveloped at present.
Financial arbitrage, in general, can also be a¤ected by the existence of agency costs
and capital constraints (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).
Finally, the extent of price arbitrage in international gas markets may be limited
because arbitrageurs themselves have a degree of market power. This can result
from a combination of the lumpinessof LNG trade and barriers to entry discussed
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above. In such cases, the optimal way to exploit a protable trading opportunity
does not lead to prices being equalized, precisely because the arbitrageur realizes that
her actions have a non-zero e¤ect on prices.27 For example, the optimal arbitrage
strategy b  arg max f [pi ( )  pj()]g of buying  units in low-price market
j to sell in high-price market i leaves pi ( b) 6= pj(b) whenever the arbitrageur has
market power in at least one of the two markets.
Taken together, these arguments suggests that, there are signicant limits to the
scale of arbitrage activity which mean that gas price di¤erentials perhaps due to
market power in the LNG supply chain have persisted.
4 Concluding remarks
Despite being connected by international trade in LNG, gas prices around the world
vary widely. It is particularly surprising that large price di¤erentials have persisted
for several years now, notably since the Fukushima accident of March 2011. Some
industry observers have thus claimed that LNG producers are behaving irrationally
by failing to engage in international price arbitrage. Such relative prices are also
di¢ cult to reconcile with a perfectly competitive model in which price di¤erences
arise solely due to transport costs.
This paper presents the rst attempt in the literature to address this puzzle.
It shows that observed prices and trade ows can be explained by LNG producers
having a degree of market power. Arbitrage by a prot-maximizing exporter takes
place by comparing marginal revenue across markets rather than only price. Di¤er-
ences in local demand conditions can leave prices far apart. We have argued that,
in addition, a combination of incentives, market power, and other constraints tends
to work against international arbitrage by LNG buyers and third-party traders.
So is gas a global market? This is partly a matter of denition. Yes, in the sense
that several LNG exporters sell into almost all major markets (except the US), and
thus connect their pricing albeit imperfectly. No, in that there is currently no clear
tendency towards a single uniform gas price (even adjusted for transport costs).
Looking ahead, a number of recent developments, on balance, suggest that the
gas market may become (even) more global. Signicant low-cost capacity may
emerge in form of LNG exports based on US shale gas. Yet other LNG projects,
notably in Australia, have higher-than-projected costs which may dampen future
27See also Borenstein, Bushnell, Knittel and Wolfram (2008) on pricing in Californian electricity
markets around the time of the Enron collapse; they show that arbitrage oppurtunities existed
between spot and forward markets but suggest these were left unexploited due to a combination
of market power and arbitrageursfear of regulatory penalties.
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supply. Production is also becoming more exible; oating liquefaction plant and
tankers with onboard regasication capabilities should make output more respon-
sive to relative prices, and recent plans (e.g., in Japan) to introduce LNG futures
contracts would facilitate hedging and arbitrage.
A natural question therefore is, how will greater price arbitrage a¤ect the global
LNGmarket? The existing theoretical literature on third-degree price discrimination
o¤ers some partial answers.28 It focuses on the e¤ect of moving from uniform
pricing, where rms are forced (e.g., by regulation) to set identical prices in all
markets, to price discrimination, where there are no such constraints on relative
prices. Turned on its head, it therefore addresses the impact of an extreme scenario:
moving from unconstrained price discrimination by LNG exporters to a world with
perfect, costless arbitrage and a single gas price.
Much of the literature focuses on the case of a monopoly selling into two separate
markets with di¤erent demand conditions (but identical marginal cost); see Aguirre,
Cowan and Vickers (2010) for a recent analysis. Under fairly mild conditions, the
resulting uniform price lies between the high and low prices under discrimination.
Moreover, price discrimination is usually associated with lower aggregate consumer
surplus (across both markets) although there are exceptions (Cowan, 2012).29
By revealed preference, moving to perfect arbitrage makes a monopolist worse o¤.
The situation is more complex for price-setting oligopoly, and the literature high-
lights the possibility that price discrimination may reduce industry prots (Corts,
1998). So it is at least conceivable that a shift to a global gas price might be positive
for LNG exporters (as a group). The impact of price discrimination on social welfare
is, in general, ambiguous, and depends, amongst other things, on the ne details
of the demand conditions across di¤erent markets.30 In the monopoly case, price
discrimination is often welfare-reducing but it is probably more likely to increase
welfare under oligopoly. So a move to perfect arbitrage may actually cause global
welfare to fall; in any case, it is clear that important distributional e¤ects arise.
However, the assumptions made to obtain these results limit their applicability
to LNG markets. First, virtually all of the existing literature focuses on monopoly
or price-setting duopoly, neither of which seems a natural choice for LNG mar-
28Stole (2007) provides a useful overview of this literature.
29A smaller number of papers examine third-degree price discrimination by price-setting
oligopolies with di¤erentiated products. With symmetric rms, the basic insights from the
monopoly case carry over (Holmes, 1989). However, a richer range of outcomes is possible if
rms are asymmetric in that they do not rank di¤erent markets in the same way, that is, a market
is regarded as strongby one rm but as weakby another rm (Corts, 1998). It is then possible
that price discrimination causes prices in both markets to move in the same direction.
30See Bergemann, Brooks and Morris (2013) for a novel welfare analysis for monopoly.
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kets. Second, most papers simply assume that rms supply all markets regardless of
the degree of price discrimination; this precludes the possibility, for example, that
greater price arbitrage might lead to some markets becoming so unattractive to LNG
exporters that they are no longer served.31 Third, it is typically assumed that each
producer has the same marginal cost for each market; this e¤ectively rules out the
existence of transport costs, which almost inevitably vary across markets.32 Fourth,
particular features of LNG market such as the existence of long-term contracting
commitments and its complex supply chain and ownership structure are not mod-
elled. Finally, from a dynamic perspective, the higher prots that rms may derive
from the ability to price discriminate can increase their incentives to invest in LNG
infrastructure in the rst place.
LNG markets seem a fruitful area for research, given their increasing importance
and the relative scarcity of existing literature. It would be useful to have more formal
results frommodels of price discrimination with more realistic market structures that
can be applied to LNG markets and elsewhere. It would be particularly interesting
to combine economic theory with more extensive market data.
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